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MINING ACTION

Tackling a Lethal and Costly Legacy of Conflict

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
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..... Audrey Roberts
Business Manager..... Derek Wright

International Peace Operations Association
1900 L Street, NW, Suite 320
Washington, D.C. 20036
United States of America

Telephone..... +1 (202) 464-0721
Facsimile +1 (202) 464-0726
E-mail..... ipoa@ipoaonline.org
Web site..... www.peaceops.com

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ARTICLES must be the original work of the author and no more than 800 words. Articles must be accompanied by a photograph and a short biography of the author. All submissions should be sent to the address above, submitted electronically at www.peaceops.com/writeforus or e-mailed to jmessner@ipoaonline.org.

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Photo: European Commission

COVER PHOTO: A sign marks an active minefield in Southern Sudan. Such minefields can paralyze entire communities.



Photo: UN Association of Georgia

PEACEKEEPING IN GEORGIA: The intricacies of Russia's entanglement in the South Caucasus. Page 18.



Photo: RAMSI

RAMSI: In the latest part of our Peacekeeping Mission Profiles series, we examine a non-UN campaign: the Solomon Islands. Page 26.

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IPOA Members Providing Critical Humanitarian Services

Companies Assist Communities Around the World by Clearing Up the Remnants of Conflict



DOUG BROOKS

THIS ISSUE OF the *Journal of International Peace Operations* highlights one of the most critical humanitarian services our industry provides – landmine removal and unexploded ordnance disposal. Every modern conflict generates highly dangerous volatile war debris that continues to kill and maim civilians for generations after the conflict, and also denies the use of huge tracts of land for commercial use. Compared to traditional military engineers, private sector companies specializing in this craft are generally equipped with more modern technologies, have greater experience and more focused training. IPOA member companies are at the fore in providing these hugely important post-conflict services.

I had the opportunity to personally witness one of our member companies engaged in a battlefield clearing operation in Afghanistan last year, and the techniques and meticulous effort that goes in to the process is truly impressive. It has also been interesting to me to see how much the companies train and utilize “host country nationals” – locals – to do the majority of the work. Those trained locals can be employed for demining and training in other countries, thereby creating a unique and valuable export service from post-conflict states. For example, there were Mozambicans conducting demining operations in Kosovo at one point, providing a valuable humanitarian service that benefits all.

IPOA has been extremely busy with

numerous projects this year. In cooperation with American University's Peacebuilding & Development Institute, IPOA held a remarkably lively and successful two-day training course and simulation entitled “Humanitarian Conduct & Enhanced Operations: Specialized Training for Field Managers and Independent Contractors.”

were able to assume and learn from roles different from their current occupations. The effort furthered IPOA’s goal of bringing together the key players in post-conflict reconstruction and stimulating understanding and cooperation between the private sector and the NGO and humanitarian sectors.

Recently, I also had the privilege once again to testify before Congress, this time in front of the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations. The hearing examined security sector training in Iraq and I was fortunate to share the a panel with Professor Deborah Avant and police advisor Gerald Burke. This was an excellent opportunity to reemphasize our Association’s interests in ensuring improved government oversight and effective accountability and to highlight importance of effective employment of the Military Extraterritoriality Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). In the testimony I outlined the advantages of utilizing the private sector for Iraqi security reform, including cost-effectiveness, staying-power, and expandability. I also discussed some of the challenges and how the government can be a smart client in directing and overseeing private sector operations. The Members of the Committee from both parties were interested and engaged, asking insightful questions.

Their comments made the hearing the most constructive and focused hearing in which I have ever participated.

Although we have come a long way, there is still an unfortunate level of suspicion leveled at the private sector in our field. Worse, there are those in governments and media who are critical of our industry but avoid or even refuse to meet with us – and then go on to complain about a ‘secretive’ industry. We have to move beyond this kind of nonsense. Effective stability and peace operations require a proactive and engaged private sector with appropriate rules, transparency and oversight. Vilifying or ignoring the private sector’s potential makes little sense and can only harm peace and stability operations in the long run.

Doug Brooks
President
International Peace Operations Association



Photo: IPOA
IPOA President Doug Brooks (left) surveys IPOA member company clearance projects in Afghanistan.

The course examined international humanitarian law, ways of improving coordination and cooperation among the key players in peace and stability operations, as well as operationalizing the IPOA Code of Conduct. Facilitated by Steve Hansch and Derek Wright, the training comprised participants from a mixed background of contractors and IPOA member employees, NGOs, humanitarian organizations and academic institutions. Keynote speeches were given by Ambassador Herman Cohen (Ret.), former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Ambassador Robert Oakley, Special Envoy to Somalia for both George H. W. Bush and William Clinton, and by renowned academic George Ayittey. They helped frame the problems and nuances that make up modern complex contingency operations.

The course was further supported by a host of specialists providing information on everything from human trafficking crimes to the principles of international law. The training was concluded with a rousing simulation of a hypothetical future UN mission to Somalia where the participants



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THE IPOA LION: MEMBER PROFILE

Evergreen International Aviation

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RECOGNIZED as one of the most respected aviation service companies in the world, Evergreen International Aviation is a privately held global aviation services company. Active through seven subsidiaries, Evergreen has more than 45 years of operating history, and employs more than 5,000 personnel who have served customers in more than 170 countries.

Evergreen is a world leader in air freight and aviation services with a broad base of customers including other air carriers and aviation companies and government agencies. Evergreen's vast experience includes specialized helicopter aviation services; air cargo transportation for major airlines and military; aircraft maintenance and repair services; helicopter and fixed wing aircraft sales; airport logistics and



Photo: Evergreen International Aviation
An Evergreen Bell 206B helicopter.

ground handling operations; and agricultural and nursery products. Many successful operations integrating these sister companies have resulted in a reputation for superb service, reliability and agility.

Profile contributed by Evergreen International

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IPOA NEWS BRIEFS

Chemonics and DynCorp Join IPOA

IPOA is pleased to announce the addition of two new companies to our Association.

Chemonics International is a global consulting firm promoting economic growth and higher living standards in developing countries. With experience in 135 countries, Chemonics has developed value solutions that are multi-disciplinary, that incorporate diverse voices and local needs, and that integrate strategies and innovations from many sectors. Chemonics' fundamental goal is to achieve substantial and lasting impact – to make a difference in people's lives.

DynCorp International is a multifaceted, global enterprise that provides innovative solutions to the diverse technology and professional services needs of government and commercial industry worldwide. DynCorp is a highly successful provider of critical support to military and civilian government institutions, and also have important commercial business in aviation, infrastructure development, security and logistics.

IPOA's membership now rests at an all-time high of 34 companies. With members based in seven countries on four continents, IPOA can truly be said to be representing the peace and stability operations industry on a global scale.

Kabul Office Feasibility Study

Parallel to her work with the Afghan Women's Network in Kabul, Afghanistan, IPOA Associate Audrey Roberts will be conducting a feasibility study into the merits of establishing a permanent IPOA Office in the Afghan capital. Recently, IPOA has been engaged in studying the feasibility of opening offices in Afghanistan, South Africa and Sudan.

IPOA Visits Fort Leavenworth

IPOA participated in a two-day CTC Commander's Conference at Ft. Leavenworth from March 21-22. The purpose of IPOA's participation was to engage the Army in dialogue on the issues faced by private security companies as they work in Iraq. IPOA provided a short presentation on the Association, followed by a second presentation given by James Gordon of ArmorGroup on challenges (including arriving at check points, entering and leaving areas of operation, running convoy's, QRF, MEDEVAC, and others) that private security companies are faced with that have a direct link to or reliance upon the U.S. Army and Coalition forces. IPOA will continue our engagement with the Army, and hopes to follow up on this meeting at Ft. Leavenworth with meetings at the JRTC at Ft. Polk, Louisiana and the NTC at Ft. Irwin, California.

IPOA Testifies on Capitol Hill

President Speaks to House Armed Services Committee



IVETA CHERNEVA

ON WEDNESDAY, April 25, the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee met to receive testimony on contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces training programs. Chairman Marty Meehan (D-Mass.) opened with a statement underlining the importance to understand both the inside and outside perspectives of the contracting process. The subcommittee invited representatives from the Departments of Defense, Justice and State, as well as representatives from the industry itself.

The speakers underlined the key point that contractors are critical to the U.S. mission in Iraq. It was noted that only 17 percent of Department of Defense contractors in Iraq are U.S. citizens. IPOA President Doug Brooks stated that using host country nationals has multiple benefits, as it strengthens the local economy, provides

training and builds capacity.

Members of Congress voiced concerns about the possibility that training can be used by terrorist groups and militias to receive training and insights into U.S. defense. They emphasized the need for accurate biometrics database to identify individuals who have been trained, have quit the training or have been rejected.

Members also focused on the possibility of a U.S. government civilian reserve corps, as an alternative to contractors. Such a project is currently underway in Department of State. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense noted that contractors are indispensable and that it counts primarily on them for the training programs in Iraq. The Pentagon cannot afford the luxury of not using contractors. President Brooks built on that argument with an emphasis on the professional experience, cost-effectiveness and risk-management that contractors offer.

The hearing was a part of a series of hearings that the current Democratic Congress has undertaken in order to exercise oversight over the contracting process and U.S. efforts in Iraq.

The author is a Research Associate at IPOA.

State of the Industry Survey 2007


Second Annual Survey Aims to Broaden Understanding of PSOI



J. J. MESSNER

AFTER IPOA produced the first-ever survey into the private security sector in 2006, the Peace Operations Institute last month issued the 2007 survey questionnaire. In a departure from the 2006 survey, the latest version will focus not just on the private security sector, but on the entire private peace and stability operations industry.

The *State of the Peace and Stability Operations Industry 2007* survey seeks to compile timely information regarding such issues as the size of the industry, the scope of operations and hiring practices. The survey also examines important issues such as



observance of international humanitarian law, including the IPOA Code of Conduct.

The 2007 survey is also designed to be far more user-friendly than the previous one, with the entire questionnaire available online. The amount of time required of respondents has also been kept to a minimum, and it is hoped that the ease of completing the survey will encourage as many companies as possible to fit this important endeavor into their busy schedules.

It is hoped that the 2007 survey will be able to draw upon a much larger pool of respondents than the 2006 effort. As an added incentive to draw as many respondents as possible, the *Journal of International Peace Operations* will be sponsoring the 2007 survey by providing in-kind donations of free advertising for any company that completes the survey.

For more information, please visit www.peaceops.org/survey.

The author is the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of International Peace Operations and is Director-General of the Peace Operations Institute and the Director of Programs and Operations at IPOA.

On Regulations for PSCs Operating in Iraq

Rules for the Use of Force Create a Clear Framework for PSCs



LAWRENCE T. PETER

TO DAY, THE private security company (PSC) industry operating in Iraq is the most thoroughly regulated segment of commercial activity in the country. Although critics claim there are no regulations governing PSC operations, in fact there are multiple regulations that govern every aspect of a PSC's operations from initial registration and vetting through the appropriate use of weapons.

Many of these regulations have their genesis during the earliest days of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Much was codified during the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) era. Today, depending upon a company's contractual relationships, a PSC can find itself operating under a multi-layered regulatory scheme, including both regulations for those companies operating directly under a U.S. Government contract and all other companies' contracts, which are governed by the regulations of the Iraq Government itself, as administered and enforced by the Iraq Ministry of Interior.

At the bottom of this regulatory pyramid are CPA orders, regulations, and memoranda. They are conveyed to the Iraqi Government through the Transitional Administrative Law upon dissolution of the CPA on 28 June 2004.¹ The Transitional Administrative Law was the governing law for the transitional Iraqi government. Subsequent to the January, October and December 2005 elections, the various CPA orders, regulations and memoranda became subject to any changes the newly elected government wished to legislate. Today, none of these relating to PSCs have been changed in their entirety. Rather, these regulations have been enhanced through additional administrative requirements layered on top.

Judging from the number of questions and comments I receive from various media, non-governmental organization and non-Iraqi governmental officials, the number one question on everyone's mind is, what are the rules for contractors using weapons in Iraq? Actually, many are surprised to know, this is an easy question to answer, one that all PSCs know the response to and one that has been ratified by the Iraq Government.

U.S. Military and Coalition forces operating in Iraq operate under what are known as Rules of Engagement. The term Rules of Engagement, when you think about it, implies the offensive use of force, i.e. "to

- RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE BY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ**
DATED: 26 June 2004
1. CONTRACTED SECURITY FORCES: Cooperate with Coalition, Multi-national and Iraqi Security Forces and comply with theater force protection policies. Do not avoid or run Coalition, Multi-national or Iraqi Security Force checkpoints. If authorized to carry weapons, do not aim them at Coalition, Multi-national or Iraqi Security Forces.
 2. USE OF DEADLY FORCE: Deadly force is that force which one reasonably believes will cause death or serious bodily harm. You may use NECESSARY FORCE, up to and including deadly force, against persons in the following circumstances:
 - a. In self-defense.
 - b. In defense of persons as specified in your contract.
 - c. To prevent life threatening offenses against civilians.
 3. GRADUATED FORCE: You should use graduated force where possible. The following are some techniques you can use if their use will not unnecessarily endanger you or others.
 - a. SHOUT; verbal warnings to HALT.
 - b. SHOVE; physically restrain, block access, or detain.
 - c. SHOW; your weapon and demonstrate intent to use it.
 - d. SHOOT; to remove the threat only where necessary.
 4. IF YOU MUST FIRE YOUR WEAPON:
 1. Fire only aimed shots.
 2. Fire with due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders.
 3. Immediately report incident and request assistance.
 5. CIVILIANS: Treat Civilians with Dignity and Respect.
 - a. Make every effort to avoid civilian casualties.
 - b. You may stop, detain, search, and disarm civilian persons if required for your safety or if specified in your contract.
 - c. Civilians will be treated humanely.
 - d. Detained civilians will be turned over to the Iraqi Police or Coalition or Multinational Forces as soon as possible.
 6. WEAPONS POSSESSION AND USE: Possession and use of weapons must be authorized by the Ministry of Interior and must be specified in your contract.
 - a. You must carry proof of weapons authorization.
 - b. You will maintain a current weapons training record.
 - c. You may not join Coalition or Multi-national Forces in combat operations except in self-defense or in defense of persons as specified in your contracts.
 - d. You must follow Coalition or Multi-national Force weapons condition rules for loading and clearing.

NOTHING IN THESE RULES LIMITS YOUR INHERENT RIGHT TO TAKE ACTION NECESSARY TO DEFEND YOURSELF.

engage." PSCs operating in Iraq do not operate under Rules of Engagement; PSCs operate under what is known as the Rules for the Use of Force. Implicit in the name Rules for the Use of Force is the acknowledgment that force may be needed, but in the context of defensive operations only. The rules that PSCs operate under in Iraq is based upon a document originally developed in 2003 by the then-coalition military command in Iraq, CJTF-7. These Rules for the Use of Force were eventually updated and replaced by the rules which were incorporated into CPA Memorandum 17.

CPA Memorandum 17 was thoroughly reviewed by lawyers of MNF/CI, lawyers of the Big Three Coalition Governments (Australia, the U.K. and the U.S.), and of course CPA lawyers themselves. There were no fundamental differences with the CJTF-7 Rules for the Use of Force, and the changes made helped to make the language a bit cleaner and more precise. The Iraqi government has adopted the rules as

incorporated in CPA Memorandum 17, and as reproduced above for information.

In the coming months, this column will discuss various items of mutual interest and concern to PSC operations in Iraq. If readers have any specific questions regarding regulations, registration, or operations in Iraq, they are encouraged to visit www.pscai.org or contact the director@pscai.org.

Readers should also be aware that All CPA orders, regulations and memoranda are available at the website www.cpa-iraq.org/ regulations.

EDITOR'S NOTE

The *Journal of International Peace Operations* is proud to welcome the Private Security Companies Association of Iraq (PSCAI) to its pages. This is the first of a regular series of columns from PSCAI, and we would like to thank them for their unique perspective from one of the world's most dangerous places.

Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance

Defusing a Far-Flung Field



PATRICIA D'COSTA

HERE IS A WIDE range of landmine discourse widely available to the interested reader. However, despite increased international concern and the presence of landmines in many parts of the world, they are generally all regarded as a basic weapon with singular effects. Noting the distinction between landmine types is useful for distilling beyond basic references to landmines and better addressing the challenges of the issue.

A landmine is defined as a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle. Landmines can basically be broken down into two main categories: anti-tank and anti-personnel. Anti-tank landmines are designed to be triggered by tanks and vehicles. Therefore, they are routinely placed on roadways and bridges. They contain enough explosives to destroy the vehicle that runs over them, as well as to injure or kill the occupants. Since more pressure is needed to detonate anti-tank landmines, they are bigger and use more explosive material. It is important to note that anti-tank landmines are not included in the 1997 *Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer or Anti-Personnel Mines*.

Anti-personnel mines comprise about 350 different types. The majority of anti-personnel landmines are either of the blast, bounding, or the fragmentation variation. The most common type of anti-personnel landmine is blast landmines. These particular mines are buried close to the surface of the ground. The mine is activated upon pressure, such as someone stepping on the area. The pressure applied then causes the landmine to detonate and destroy objects in the near vicinity. Victims who step on blast items routinely have their foot or leg shattered upon impact.

Another type of landmine is the bounding variety. Unlike blast landmines, bounding landmines are not buried totally underground, but instead have a small section protruding from the ground. As a result, bounding landmines can be activated by pressure or by a tripwire. Upon activation, the landmine is ignited by a propelling charge which lifts the mine. The main charge then activates, damaging the head and chest of the landmine victim.

Fragmentation landmines use elements

The author is a Research Associate at IPOA.

*A blast landmine.**A fragmentation "Claymore" anti-personnel mine.**A bounding anti-personnel landmine.**A butterfly anti-personnel landmine.*

Photo: U.S. House of Representatives
Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-Georgia) holds a cluster munition in her left hand and a humanitarian food package in her right hand.





Photo: Chuck Prichard/U.S. Army
IEDs can take on many disguises, such as a tire abandoned by the side of the road. This is a simulated example from Iraq.

of either the blast or bounding variety. Unlike the blast landmine which localizes impact, fragmentation mines use shards to spread the damage. Due to their design, airborne butterfly mines attract children. Homemade landmines are considered to comprise a segment of improvised explosive devices, commonly known by their acronym, IEDs.

Landmines continue to pose a significant threat because they remain active in the ground for a long time and can injure

or kill children or other civilians indiscriminately. Recent landmine technology uses self-deactivation which prompts a mine to blow itself up after a certain amount of time. This process can be controlled by remote-control. The deactivation can be pre-programmed to occur within a few hours to a few weeks of planting. A battery in the mine can also be designed to gradually lose its charge. Such mines are intended to stay active for a maximum of three months.



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Work in Progress

2007 Marks the Tenth Anniversary of the Ottawa Treaty Banning Anti-Personnel Landmines



PATRICIA D' COSTA

THIS DECEMBER will mark the ten year anniversary of the signing of the Ottawa Treaty, known formally as *The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel mines and on their Destruction*.

The Convention is noteworthy for a number of reasons. It was the first treaty to ban the deployment of a currently-used weapon. It was also ratified very rapidly, with treaty negotiations lasting only one year. Further, it was also ratified by a record 122 countries at its inauguration. The Convention was adopted on September 18, 1997 and entered into force on March 1, 1999. Today, 153 countries have ratified or adhere to the Convention.

According to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the Convention is "a hybrid of international humanitarian law and international disarmament law. It has characteristics of a disarmament treaty, but has a purely humanitarian purpose." Member states pledge to destroy their anti-personnel mine stockpiles "as soon as possible but not later than four years" after joining the Convention. Article 3 provides some exceptions to this measure. Furthermore, states are obliged to clear landmines already planted on their territory within 10 years. The first deadline will lapse on March 1, 2009. However, due to the extensive dispersal of landmines in parts of the world and a lack of resources, the Convention allows for member states to apply for demining extensions. To apply for such an extension, states must provide a detailed explanation, including the associated humanitarian, social, economic and environmental implications.

Instead of an organization to monitor and verify obligations, the Convention emphasizes national oversight and the support of the UN to settle disputes. Article 7 calls for annual transparency reports on compliance, which include information on:

1. national implementation measures;
2. size of anti-personnel mine stockpiles; location of mined areas;
3. numbers and types of mines retained for Article 3 purposes;
4. status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of mine production facilities;
5. progress of stockpile destruction; and
6. details of mine awareness programs.

The United Nations serves as a dispute



Photo: Evan Schneider/UN
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien presents the instruments of ratification to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the 1997 Ottawa Convention.

resolution source, and these transparency reports are made publicly available by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs.

The Convention has also spawned so-called Contact Groups, informal mechanisms which allow member states and non-member states to meet to discuss issues of shared concern such as information sharing, resource management and potential co-operation on mine action. The Delegate Sponsorship Program provides about 100 delegates financial support to attend meetings to ensure better international representation.

The Ottawa Convention was seen as a model because it brought together multi-sectoral participants in the pursuit of a common goal. The issue quickly attracted international involvement from non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and governments notably the efforts of Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, as well as Jody Williams and her organization, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). In fact, Williams and the ICBL later won the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize for their work in the banning and clearing of anti-personnel landmines. The Norwegian Nobel Committee lauded the process for "future areas of disarmament and peace." Today, the ICBL is a network of more than 1,400 groups in 90 countries. The ICBL produces *Landmine Monitor*, a comprehensive report on global landmine developments.

April 4, 2007 marked the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon took the opportunity to highlight the threat still posed to millions of people in about 80 countries who face injury and death from landmines. However, thanks to "concerted efforts", he is encouraged that real gains have been made in mine action, which includes promoting a universal ban on landmines, safely destroying stockpiles, helping victims cope with landmine injuries, local mine education and landmine detection and removal.

Despite its significant contribution to mine action, the United States is the most conspicuous non-signatory to the Convention. According to the Department of State, "landmines still have a valid and essential role in military operations. Landmines enable a commander to shape the battlefield to his advantage ... No other weapon exists that provides all the capabilities provided by landmines." Other non-members include China, Russia, India, Pakistan and Israel.

CORE PROVISIONS OF THE OTTAWA TREATY

Article 1—General Obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
 - a) To use anti-personnel mines;
 - b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
 - c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article 3—Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted.

An Effective First Step in Stability Operations

Eliminating the Threat of Mines and UXOs is a Critical Step Towards Restoring Normality



BILL PEARSE

MINES ARE ubiquitous, and in some portions of the world, so much so that the adjective 'mine-ravaged' seems to be obligatory when describing certain countries. While the task of making these areas safe from the continuing scourge of mines is daunting, it remains a critical first step in re-establishing the safety and stability so necessary to commercial investment in infrastructure and resource development in emerging nations.

The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) is perhaps unique in its perspective, given that it overtly connects demining to the overall web of issues associated with security and stability operations worldwide. This article is intended to provide a general background to the mine issue, and describe an action model which recasts demining from strictly humanitarian grounds to one more closely linked with stability operations and national reconstruction, where IPOA has considerable interest and capability.

Literally too many to count, landmines remain a significant international issue and a significant threat in some parts of the world. In 2005, five people per day were killed due to mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). Being relatively inexpensive, and quite effective, mines have become a weapon of choice in many conflicts. Former Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, famously mined the Kuwaiti oil fields during the first Gulf War, and his threats to do so in the more recent Iraq war were taken expressly into account in coalition battle planning.

Minefields are often laid between countries either in conflict (Eritrea and Ethiopia) or those simply apprehensive about their border defenses (Turkey and Syria). Perhaps topping this unfortunate list, Afghanistan has, as a result of a succession of wars, become the most heavily mined location on earth, littered with hundreds of millions of mines, affecting one percent of its

total land area. One-sixth of the communities in Afghanistan are contaminated with mines. At one point, the only viable industry in Afghanistan was a prosthetic manufacturing concern.

The number of landmines being deployed is decreasing, due to the 1997 Ottawa Convention and other circumstances. However, the amount of ERW, perhaps even more dangerous than mines because they are often found on the ground surface (and are routinely handled for the scrap recycle value), is expanding significantly as a result



Photo: European Commission

Even long after a conflict is over, communities are forced live in areas that still pose a serious threat to their safety due to the presence of landmines and UXOs. Here, a sign marks the presence of landmines in a village in northern Cambodia.

of the war in Iraq and armed conflicts in other areas.

While primary responsibility for mine action lies with the Government in whose boundaries the mines lie, many such Governments are unable or unwilling to take a leadership role on the actual cleanup. In many cases, it is simply a matter of scarce financial resources. Sometimes, there are institutional issues, such as how best to set priorities and allocate resources among several provinces, or external and internal political considerations that also complicate or impede the decision process. The net result is that few developing countries, where much of the mine problems seem to be concentrated, can themselves take a leadership role and implement a sustainable, multi-year program.

In the absence of such programmatic

leadership, the United Nations is the most prominent among all institutions to develop and support a comprehensive strategy to clean up mines. The United Nations 2006-2010 Mine Action Strategy reaffirms the agency's commitment to reducing the risks of mines and ERW through compliance with international treaties, prioritization of investments in cleanup projects, partnership with all affected parties (including non-state actors), and effective oversight. Its 2006 situation analysis recognizes an increased institutional understanding of the technical

issues associated with cleaning up landmines and ERW, significantly decreased production and use, and sustained commitment, both in terms of financial resources and political priority, to solving the problems. Finally, the UN recognizes the principal risk to sustaining the current progress and meeting the program objectives are associated with maintaining funding, and recommends that donor nations integrate mine action with developmental funding so as to preserve its integrity as global economic conditions fluctuate.

National governments also support mine action programs for their own humanitarian and policy regions, and the level of their support is in fact

larger than the private donor community. While not as widespread as UN support of NGOs, the overall budget commitment is larger.

The United States Government has a significant Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) program, budgeted at approximately US\$100 million per year, designed to reduce or eliminate the threat and impact of landmines and ERW. The basis for this program is the belief that safe neutralization of ERW and landmines will establish a safe and secure environment in which to conduct stabilization, reconstruction and peacekeeping operations. The Department of State is the U.S. government's lead agency for this program, although the Department of Defense is its primary implementer. Its vision is the elimination of death, injuries and suffering of civilian noncombatants due

Demining: Brining Communities Back to Normality

FROM page 11
BILL PEARSE

to ERW, and the establishment of better working relationships between nations.

The U.S. program seeks to establish sustainable mine action programs by training indigenous personnel, by sharing demining program lessons learned among participating nations, instilling management and leadership skills, fostering use of innovative technology, and by direct joint action in addressing intractable or high-visibility contamination problems. Often involving direct work with foreign military units, the program capitalizes on the unique capabilities of the U.S. military in language and technical skills, situational awareness, technology, and teamwork to complete humanitarian demining projects. Working jointly in this manner, personal professional-military relationships engender better trust between commands and nations, open informal lines of communications (which may become very important in the future) and enhance military interoperability while at the same time achieving genuine humanitarian results.

HMA projects have included assessments in Uzbekistan, Senegal, Tunisia and Tajikistan; high-altitude demining in Chile; leadership and management training in Colombia; technology demonstrations in Ecuador; and software training worldwide.

The Canadian Government is similarly active in funding demining activities particularly in Afghanistan, where it has committed substantial resources.

The UN's institutional approach to demining must be the starting point for moving forward into the planning and implementation of larger, more comprehensive national demining efforts; programs that are funded by investors rather than donors. It is in this landscape that commercial demining can occur on a larger scale, one where the efficiencies of technology, management and technical expertise, and rigorous contract administration could result in greater and more predictable results than what has inescapably become the piecemeal approach of inconsistent donors and the low intensity of NGO field actions.

The UN has a well-established method of developing and integrating national demining expertise into its programs in any country. By issuance of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), the UN sets the technical standard for National Mine

Action Authorities to accredit mine action organizations (both commercial organizations and NGOs) to conduct mine action work within that country. In cases where a nation lacks a mine action center, the UN typically has its own mine action office in country which acts in largely the

opportunity for commercial firms, either by direct contract with foreign governments, or through U.S. government programs, notably the Department of State Weapons Removal and Abatement contract. Because of their size, scope, and duration, these more comprehensive programs can include development of a number of areas of expertise which support the mine action program, such as risk assessment, project and program management, training, and technology development elements. Each of these skill sets is also transferable to infrastructure and other development.

This comprehensive mine action model is particularly well-suited to IPOA. Its member firms are familiar with working programs in association with foreign governments, and are well-experienced in working effectively with Local Nationals.

IPOA membership has always included firms which conduct commercial demining operations, including ArmorGroup, EOD Technology, Demining Enterprises

International, DynCorp and RONCO. IPOA also has close relationships with NGOs which conduct demining. Increasingly, demining has become a component of larger issues associated with the national re-stabilization. For example, Sudan has placed increased emphasis on demining as a component of its national plebiscite scheduled in 2010. Fearful that displaced persons, many of whom would be traveling on foot, could not safely return to their home districts, the government has indicated an interest in cleaning mines up along the principal roadways. Similarly, as petroleum exploration comes onshore in Angola, safety concerns must be addressed before the investment in the infrastructure necessary to support such operations can commence in earnest. No significant construction proceeds in Afghanistan without demining occurring in advance.

IPOA's well-earned reputation for objectivity in stability operations issues can be extended to include mine action as a frequent predecessor to peacekeeping. By linking its Code of Conduct with the international mine action standards, its working relationships with the U.S. and other governments, and its credibility with the financial community and extractives industries, IPOA is a natural forum for establishing commercial demining and ERW management on a much larger footing than now exists, promoting the onset of real stability in troubled parts of the world.



Photo: Kitt Amarantin/U.S. Department of Defense
A U.S. soldier engaged in demining operations in Iraq. Though some demining operations are carried out by the military, much of the work falls to private companies and NGOs.

same capacity, to serve as a focal point for mine action programs and expertise.

The general requirements for accreditation are as follows:

- corporate structure, organization and financial information of applicant;
- resources, including personnel, equipment and facilities, subcontractors;
- experience, past and present; and
- technical standard operating procedures.

Attaining accreditation is a significant milestone. The accreditation process ensures program conformance to the UN's International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and, similar to ISO or any other internationally accepted standard, becomes a sort of shorthand designating those firms which can execute demining on a safe and substantial level, ensuring high quality, good management and commercial viability. Only accredited organizations can work on UN mine action projects.

Developing nations may elect to increase their demining program intensity now, as they benefit from increased petroleum revenue, in order to project a safer, more stable image to the international investment community. Some nations are now in a position to effect a broader, more aggressive program, and now have the political will or investment reason to do so. These national programs, should they emerge, must still be based on the accreditation process, and the technical and management quality assurance that ensures the land is made safe. However, the larger national programs open an

Challenges of Demining in Africa

A User's Guide to Demining in a Quarter of the World's Landmined Countries

JOHANN VAN DEN HEEVER

CONDUCTING DEMINING OR battle area clearance projects in Africa is no different than projects in Iraq, Afghanistan or other parts of the world. Companies working in Africa do so under the same rules and standards, especially those of International Mine Action Standards and with the risks involved that is always part of any clearance program.

According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2006, 79 countries of the world have a problem with landmines and unexploded ordnance or explosive remnants of war (ERW). Of the 91 countries, 23 are in Africa.

This article focuses on how clearance operations in Africa differ from those in other parts of the world. It must be stated that the writer and his company are mostly involved in clearance activities on behalf of commercial clients and not any humanitarian clearance projects. Operating on behalf of commercial interests does not mean that these clearance projects do not have a positive influence on the local population of an affected area. On the contrary, these clearance projects have a significantly positive effect on the local population.

These positive effects include infrastructure reconstruction, new job opportunities and skills development, and clearing areas to be used for the benefit of the local population.

Humanitarian mine clearance activity on the African continent is in a crisis situation. The local population is at risk daily of landmine or ERW accidents. If funding can be found for small clearance projects around small villages and towns, such projects will make a huge humane difference to especially the children and the day-to-day lives of the inhabitants. Mine clearance operations in Africa have its own positives. These positives will be around forever.

The local population receives demining companies well in their areas, and their gratitude is forever. People of a small village where only a few landmines are cleared and removed around a watering hole will always be thankful and grateful.

As these areas where companies work are mostly in remote areas, companies have no choice to do some social good as well. Our company, in coordination with the village administration, tried to facilitate secondary health clinics, which is especially helpful to women and children.

The author is Managing Director of Demining Enterprises International, an IPOA member company based near Pretoria, South Africa.

The photograph in the center of the page shows the legs of a landmine victim. He lost his lower leg and created his own prosthesis out of bamboo and copper wire, which have now grown into his leg. This victim walked approximately 12 kilometers in the hope that our company would be able to assist him in finding a suitable prosthesis for his leg. This is just one of the countless tragedies left by the legacy of landmines and ERW on the African continent.

In most countries on the continent where clearance is carried out, extended civil wars took place. Mostly these are wars long-over by the time that companies will begin clearance projects. Therefore the risk to companies and their staff from active conflict is quite low. The security risk is probably less than even just 1 percent of that experienced in Afghanistan or Iraq. The security risk in these areas, where it does exist, is mainly with regard to petty crimes such as theft.

There should be no doubt that there is a huge need for clearance projects and funding for clearance projects on the African continent. Both humanitarian and commercial clearance projects will go a long way in making Africa a safer place.

It will also mean opening up of the continent for investments, but mostly it will normalize the lives of millions of women and children in the outer rural areas of Africa. To us, who work in Africa on a daily basis, we see our work as a peace operation on its own, even if it is far away from the bright lights of the



Photo: Demining Enterprises International

The legs of a landmine victim. He fashioned his own makeshift prosthetic limb fashioned out of bamboo and wire.

rest of the world. We want to urge decision makers all over the world to lend companies on the continent a helping hand, or a hand of friendship in trying to free the African continent of these silent killers.

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Clearing Cluster Bombs

Locating and Clearing Hazardous Remnants of Conflict



DAVE McDONNELL

IT IS ESTIMATED that there are millions of cluster bombs outstanding globally. The challenges posed by these munitions are immense. The contaminated area poses a direct threat to communities and the displaced, hampering humanitarian relief, impeding the movement of peacekeeping troops and hindering the already difficult task of rebuilding homes and essential infrastructure in the area.

Cluster bomb clearance programs are therefore critical to the sustainable redevelopment of the region, as until the contamination is cleared it is almost impossible for local communities to repopulate their homes and restart their economy safely and confidently.

The indiscriminate nature of cluster bombs is part of the problem. As they come in all shapes and sizes, it is difficult to generalize on their treatment. Dealing with cluster bombs safely and securely requires experience and careful planning. That said, it is perhaps not as difficult and dangerous as many would suspect.

There are significant risks involved, as although cluster bombs often do not carry powerful explosives, they can easily kill or maim if not properly dealt with. Inevitably, mistakes do occur and injuries may happen. Human error, not the inherent danger of the munitions, is the major challenge in any clearance program.

To counter this challenge, high quality standards and systems of work have to be set at the outset, with many of the principles laid out in the UN's International Mine Action Standards and supported by local National Technical Safety Guidelines. The more risk involved, in terms of location and intensity, the more careful and thoughtful the planning has to be.

In an ideal world, the organization which deployed the cluster bombs will be on hand to help. In Kosovo, NATO forces provided details of where and when cluster bombs were deployed and what delivery systems were used. This enabled clearance

teams to pinpoint with high degrees of accuracy where the munitions were and to make them secure.

If the organization which deployed the cluster bombs is unable or unwilling to cooperate, then local communities are often able to help. Cluster bombs are relatively easy to identify and people do not easily forget where and when they were dropped. Therefore, reports from affected communities can assist in the identification of threat areas, although often they sadly



Seeking out unexploded cluster bombs in Lebanon.

There has been significant progress against the use of cluster bombs already in 2007 with the likelihood of yet more success by the end of the year. Around 46 nations signed a declaration on cluster bombs following the Oslo Convention in February, with further meetings planned for Lima, Vienna and Dublin, building towards the planned signing of a Cluster Bomb Treaty in 2008. The treaty is aimed at prohibiting the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions which cause unacceptable harm to civilians.

However, not all countries are participating. The United States, Russia, China, Israel, India and Pakistan have shunned the meetings arguing that the topic should be left to relevant international forums such as the United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons. Campaigners counter that building a consensus against the use and production of cluster bombs will lead to a drop in usage. For example, although the major powers refused to sign the Land Mines Treaty the use of land mines has dropped

significantly.

The U.K. Government has been prominent in the campaign against cluster bombs and in March this year committed to the immediate withdrawal of "dumb" cluster bombs (those without self-destruct mechanisms) which will lead to around 28 million munitions being destroyed.

The U.K. government also announced it would pay for specialist Explosive Detection Dogs to travel to Lebanon to help clear unexploded cluster bombs. There is a lot of cleaning up to do, as last summer's conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is estimated to have left around a million unexploded cluster bombs along with the legacy of land mines from previous fighting.

Since October we have been putting the principles outlined above into practice while carrying out a United Arab Emirates sponsored battle area clearance program to clear the cluster bombs in South Lebanon, in support of the United Nations Humanitarian Aid Relief efforts in Lebanon. So far we have cleared almost four million square meters of land and destroyed over 3,000 bomblets and other explosive remnants of war, but expect to continue to carry out the environmental remediation of cluster bombs in Lebanon and elsewhere for many years to come.

The author is Director, Mine Action for ArmorGroup International plc, and was previously with the UN as the Quality Assurance officer at the Mine Action Centre in Zagreb. ArmorGroup is an IPOA member company.

The Economic Impact on Society of Landmines and UXOs

Cheap Devices Leave an Expensive Legacy



TEYE BRANDSMA

WHEN examining the economic impact of landmines and unexploded ordinance (UXO), there is a very obvious cost of mine action. Specifically, there is the cost of physically removing the devices from the soil, the medical cost of assisting victims of landmines and the cost of educating people in mine affected countries.

Beyond these obvious costs is the cost of not being able to use land affected by mines and explosives for economic activities and furthermore the cost to the economy of citizens injured and maimed by the devices. Apart from the economic there is the mental damage incurred to families by such deaths and inflicted injuries, which has its own negative effect on the economic productiveness of a community.

A serious problem in fighting landmine proliferation is the significant cost gap between the material cost of producing and laying a mine and the cost of subsequently removing such a device. Because of a reluctance on the part of politicians and military staff to disclose information on deployment and injuries or deaths relating to mines, the numbers are very rough estimates. However, the figures concerning the impact of landmines and UXOs on society (see tables) are quite sobering.

Based on this research and the fact that more mines were deployed than removed over the years that followed the research, one can only imagine the vastness of the socio-economic cost of landmines and UXOs. Keep in mind that by the nature of the wounds, those injured by landmines and UXOs often require more than two or more operations, not to mention lifetime medical assistance, which can often lead to financial ruin for the family of the injured and for generations to come.

There is some good news though. The *Landmine Monitor Report of 2006*¹ shows a decrease in the number of people injured or killed by landmines from 26,000 in 1997 to between 15,000 and 20,000 in 2006. This is largely due to the increase in demining efforts (740 square kilometers cleared in 2005) under the Ottawa Convention rules and increased Mine Risk Education efforts by several NGO's in more countries than ever before.

On the other hand, the report does include some negative remarks. Global mine action funding, although higher than what it was in 2003, fell by US\$23 million compared

to 2004, which sets it on a grand total of US\$376 million per annum. Furthermore, the funding for assistance to victims of landmines has similarly decreased.

In short, apart from the cost of demining, the economic impact of landmines and UXO on the society of affected countries stretches far beyond the intended use of the landmines and other ordinance. The low production cost of these devices when compared to the incurred cost of these devices is unfathomable and illustrates the importance and urgency of continued mine action.




Photo: UN Office of the Iraq Program
A nurse dresses the wound of a landmine victim in Iraq.

ENDNOTES

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IMPACT OF LANDMINES AND UXOS IN NUMBERS

The cost of producing one landmine: Between \$5 and \$30

The cost of removing one landmine: Between \$500 and \$2,500

Approximate number of landmines deployed around the world: 84,000,000

Cost of clearing them: \$33,000,000,000

Length of time required to clear them at the current rate: 1,100 years

The estimated number of people with disabilities caused by landmines/UXO: 500,000

New victims per month: 2,000 including 900 fatalities

All costs quoted in U.S. Dollars.

Source: International Committee of the Red Cross. 1997. *Anti-Personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe?*

CASE STUDY



To illustrate the economic impact of landmines and UXO on society below are some of the key findings of a research project, publicized on September 16, 1995 in the *British Medical Journal*, by Community Information and Epidemiological Technologies (CIET),² who conducted research on the social cost of landmines in four countries: Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Mozambique:



- Between 25% and 87% of households were affected by land mines
- 1 in 20 households reported a land mine victim, a third of them dying
- 1 in 10 of the 2100 victims was a child
- The incidence of land mine accidents has more than doubled between 1980-83 and 1990-93, excluding the recent war in Bosnia
- Without mines, agricultural production could increase by between 88% and 200% in Afghanistan, 11% in Bosnia, 135% in Cambodia, and between 3% and 6% nationally in Mozambique
- A total of 54,554 animals were lost due to land mines, with a minimum cash value of nearly \$200 per household
- Households with a land mine victim were 40% more likely to have difficulty providing food for the family



An Unlikely Hero of De-Mining and UXO Disposal

The African Pouched Rat Provides an Innovative Approach to Mine Action



CHRISTOPHER ROCHESTER

UNDOCUMENTED mine fields and unexploded ordnance (UXO) pose a severe threat to security, relief and development efforts. Mines are often laid haphazardly and indiscriminately, remaining active and dangerous for years, regardless of peace agreements or ceasefires. As a result, the horrors of mine injuries are borne primarily by the civilian population, killing and maiming 20,000 people every year. In addition to the direct consequences of detonation, mines render large swathes of land unusable for agricultural and infrastructural improvement, further hampering economic activity often when it is most needed.

While methods for minefield clearing and UXO disposal are readily available, these techniques can be expensive and time consuming. Because many of the worst affected regions of the world are impoverished areas in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the imperative for mine disposal is not always realized. Logistical and financial constraints often prevent timely and effective minefield clearance. However, this dynamic may be changing.

Recognizing the inhibiting factors of cost and time, alternative methods of mine detection and disarmament are currently being developed. One alternative of particular interest and promise is the use of the giant African pouched rat for de-mining purposes. This type of rat offers several advantages over traditional human or dog detection methods.

The rat has an outstanding sense of smell to compensate for its poor vision. All except the most sophisticated mines emit chemical scents, and a highly evolved nose is required to distinguish between ambient smells and those belonging to dangerous explosives. The rat can be trained from birth to detect the chemical signatures commonly used in mines and scratch the ground when this smell is detected. Few machines are capable of detecting the subtle vapor signatures emitted by landmines, and the associated high cost renders this approach impractical in most situations.

Manual minefield clearing is slow, deliberate and laborious work. The margin for error is small because a mistake can mean the difference between life and death. Replacing human detection with rat-based detection helps to relieve much of the stress mine sweeping incurs, while simultaneously

dramatically improving the time in which an area can be cleared. Rats adore simplistic, repetitive tasks, and a simple reward system motivates the rat to find another mine.

APOPO, a Belgian demining NGO, is currently making significant progress in implementing the rodent-driven detection method. APOPO maintains a regional training center in Tanzania and has been active in neighboring Mozambique, where severe mine saturation in the countryside has impeded humanitarian assistance and infrastructure development. The company is developing a two-stage method for mine detection. First, earth and air samples are taken from suspected areas, captured by special filters. The rats are able to detect traces of explosive vapor on the filters, quickly identifying which areas merit closer inspection.

The areas that test positive for explosive traces are carefully swept by the rats. Suspected areas are divided into boxes of 100 square meters. The rat is leashed and operated by a trainer, clearing the box in less than half an hour. This time is a significant improvement over both dog and human-based mine detection methods. This two-stage approach maximizes the utility of the trainers and rats by eliminating mine-free areas before the final sweep.

The African pouched rat also provides important cost advantages. The animals are plentiful throughout Africa, where countries like Angola, Sierra Leone and Mozambique continue to struggle with mines and UXO. Being indigenous to the area brings the additional bonus of immunity from many of the diseases that foreign animals are susceptible to, further lowering the cost of

operating and maintaining the rats. Their small size also decreases food and transportation costs, allowing mine sweepers to move and support numerous rats for the typical cost of one dog.



Photo: Gambian Rats
Above: The African Pouched Rat.



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Latin America and Third Country Nationals in PSOs

Employment Scandals Threaten to Derail Industry Efforts in the Region



YLANA GRACIELLI

THE HIRING OF Third Country Nationals (TCNs) is not a new phenomenon in the peace and stability industry. Generally, the relationship between employer and employee is positive and successful.

However, that is not always the case. Although the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Nicaragua are the only Latin American countries that have at some point deployed troops to, or supported operations in Iraq, these troops were not the only "Latinos" working side by side with the Coalition of the Willing.

Since the beginning of 2005, various newspapers from both Latin America and the United States have reported stories concerning Latin American TCNs that were allegedly being hired illegally in their country of origin and then being sent to work for private security companies in Iraq. These reports also described the Latin American TCNs as "mercenaries," further adding a dramatic background to the stories, characterizing the employees as non-Americans fighting a war that is not "theirs." These same reports also alleged that companies were luring the soldiers into going to Iraq with the promise of large sums of money and then breaking contractual clauses by not paying them what was promised, and furthermore holding their passports, thereby impeding them from easily returning to their home countries.

In the midst of so much bad press one has to take a step back and ask the some tough questions. What are the advantages of hiring Latin American TCNs or TCNs in general? What is the legal status of the companies that hire them? Further, have those companies acted contrary to national or international law? And finally, why is the press so unfriendly when it comes to reporting these activities?

Hiring Third Country Nationals usually mean cheap labor. And that is not necessarily a bad thing. The company may offer them salaries as much as 10 times more than they would normally make. There have even been complaints that companies have been paying *too much* to some TCNs, based on the differential of their home economy. At the same time the company saves on financial resources and still gets the same quality service, the workers are happy to make salaries that are quite substantial in comparison to what they might hope to earn in their own countries. In most cases, this system works perfectly well.

However, there have been allegations, mostly reported in the Latin American media, that some companies misrepresented the terms of the employment contracts at the time of signing in the home or originating country, and substituted far less favorable contracts by the time the employees arrived in Iraq. Essentially, a bait and switch tactic.



Photo: University of Florida
Colombians, along with other Latin Americans, are employed as TCNs by companies in Iraq.

Besides payment issues, some employees have also complained that once they arrived in Iraq, they suffered degrading and racist treatment.

The validity of these allegations is yet to be proven. Nevertheless, such activities are expressly prohibited by the IPOA Code of Conduct. Beyond this, such activities would likely violate contractual clauses and potentially certain labor laws. So, given the potential legal issues inherent in such activity, what is the legal status of the companies that hire these TCNs?

In the Latin American experience, the contractors were hired by local companies, who acted mostly as brokers or mediators for other, generally international, companies. The local "brokers" hired, trained and then transported the employees to their destinations in Iraq. So, to be clear, the violations of these TCNs' rights, if true, were perpetrated by local companies, quite separate from the companies within peace and stability operations industry itself.

At this time, there has not been any in-depth official investigation regarding the legal status of these companies, with the

exception of two particular cases in Brazil. In these cases, the Brazilian federal police investigated the supposedly illegal recruitment of 35 men – some still actively engaged in the armed forces – and went so far as to arrest the executives of the broker company. This case is still ongoing, as high-rank officials from the Army have been implicated as well. The key point is that in all reported cases the companies did not appear to have met acceptable legal standards, presenting at least the perception of a scam.

This incident further highlights the sensationalist nature of media reportage of the industry in many parts of the world, and particularly in Latin America. Private companies that operate in conflict or post-conflict zones are rarely presented in a positive light, despite the critically important role they play in conflict and post-conflict environments. The Latin American media consistently portrays private companies and their employees in the peace and stability operations industry as "mercenaries."

The fact that these companies get paid to execute tasks that enhance the effectiveness – both in terms of logistics and comfort – of soldiers and civilians in conflict zones is a foreign concept to reporters from Latin America. This sensationalist slant on the reporting of the industry is a clear indication of a lack of understanding of the manner in which the industry operates and the activities in which it is involved.

The future is unclear for the peace and stability operations industry in Latin America. Despite the significant contributions of TCNs from countries from the continent, media and societal attitudes have not yet caught up with operational reality. However, as long as the Latin American media continues to provide such a negative and sensationalist line against the industry, it is unlikely that these societal attitudes will change anytime soon. And if these employee abuse allegations against the local broker companies prove to be true, the perceptions of the industry in the region will only suffer, even in spite of the fact that these nefarious activities likely took place without the knowledge of the foreign firms that contracted with the local brokers.

Flawed contracts, broken promises and murky legal structures serve the interests of no one. Latin American TCNs, and for that matter TCNs of any nationality, are willing to work in the industry as long as it is properly regulated and fair treatment can be assured. In the end, this episode should hopefully demonstrate that the more sensibly regulated the industry becomes, the better it will be for both employers and employees.

The author is a Research Associate at IPOA.

Trouble Coming: Ethnic Conflicts in the South Caucasus

Georgia, Russia and the Geopolitical Considerations Concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia



IVETA CHERNEVA

DURING WORLD WAR II the South Caucasus was a strategically important region due to its geopolitical value and natural resources wealth. Recently discovered hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian Seas have opened up new possibilities for oil and gas exports to Western markets.

Naturally, external players have been drawn to the region. Russia has the greatest interest in the South Caucasus, intent on retaining its hegemony that it has maintained for the past two centuries. The European Union, concerned with its 'near-abroad' policy, is inevitably present in the analysis, as is NATO. Finally, the U.S. is a key external player, especially since a recent paradigm shift in diversification of energy resources and attempts to move away from dependency upon oil in the Persian Gulf.¹

Within that geopolitical framework we find the three states of the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Diverse in culture, language and religion, the states have had very different relations with the Great Powers of the previous century, as well as with the key Western powers and Russia since WWII. Notably, Georgia has been the most pro-Western state among the three at any time, balancing against Russia. That tension receives its culmination today, with Georgia's intrastate ethnic tensions in the center of the framework and the EU, Russia, NATO and the U.S. invariably in the background.

For the past 15 years Georgia has attempted to distance itself from Russia, hence its burning passion and support for the EU, U.S. and NATO. Georgia has openly declared its desire to become a member of NATO and the European Union. Curiously, although not a member-state, Georgia fervently displays the EU symbols without hesitation – much to the disapproval of Russia's watchful eye. Currently a NATO partner under the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), Georgia is not a full-fledged member yet. In this context, concerns about the implications of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty have been raised. As Article 5 provides, an attack on one NATO member implies an attack on all. An attack on the territorial integrity of Georgia by Russia would leave NATO puzzled about the proper response.

As a legacy of the Russian Empire and later, the Soviet Union, ethnic and political boundaries in the region do not coincide,

which makes the region a ticking bomb, and possible accession of Georgia to NATO promises trouble. Ultimately, as a reminder of an old-fashioned Cold War scenario, it would be Russia and NATO drawn into a local ethno-territorial conflict, respectively opposing or supporting Georgian policy.

The root of trouble is in two northern provinces in Georgia that border Russia—Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The leadership



Photo: Government of Poland
Georgia's pro-Western President, Mikheil Saakashvili.

of the unrecognized republic of South Ossetia aims towards the unification of the province with North Ossetia, a region within the confines of Russia. Even a more serious problem is the one with the self-proclaimed Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. Both issues pose a serious threat to the territorial integrity of Georgia.

The territory of Abkhazia represents a significant portion of Georgia. The Abkhaz minority comprises 1.7 percent of the total population of Georgia and only 18 percent of the Abkhazia province itself.² The province declared independence from Georgia in July, 1992. Amid a civil war, Russia unofficially aided the secessionist movement. Ethnic cleansing of Georgians followed. The unusual aspect is that, in contrast to ethnic cleansing where minority groups become the target, in this case, the ethnic group of the majority was targeted. That left 300,000 refugees and internally displaced people throughout Georgia and abroad.

Russian involvement in the conflict can be assessed through the geopolitical prism of Russia's 'imperial nostalgia'.³ Russia considers all post communist countries within its sphere of influence. Furthermore, Georgia is the only state in the South

Caucuses that has access to the Black Sea. Because of this, pipelines transporting oil from the Caspian Sea to Western Europe can easily avoid Russian territory. That makes Georgia an actual competitor to Russia.⁴ Georgia has made clear that it is going to exercise its sovereignty and independence. It has requested Russia's withdrawal from its military bases and also refused to let Russian armies pass through its territory to attack the Chechen rebels in 1999. Paired with Georgia's West-oriented foreign policy, the situation poses a real threat to Russia, who has been considered the sole master of the region.

To illustrate Russia's aggressive response, one only needs to look at some recent developments. Russia deals differently with ethno-territorial conflicts in Georgia, on one hand, and Azerbaijan, on the other hand, supporting Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and destabilizing Georgia. Supply of energy to Georgia can be cut-off by Russia at any time, as the 2006 oil crisis in Ukraine shows. Russia has the power to limit cash-remittances flow to Georgia from Georgians working in Russia, who send back money to their families. This was the case in 2006. The effect was indisputably adverse to Georgia's economy.

A number of UN Security Council Resolutions have also supported Georgia's territorial integrity. Nevertheless, since 1993 Russian peacekeepers have been operating in Abkhazia. From its base in Gudauta, Russia has supported and supplied arms to the secessionist movement. Although Russia officially declared it had pulled out of the base, it left several hundred marines behind.

The ethnic-territorial conflicts in Georgia pose a serious challenge to peace because they can conceivably entangle more than one external actor. The stakes that Russia, the U.S., the EU, Turkey and Iran have in the region and possible Georgian NATO membership, all make the region explosive. Russia seems to be fueling the conflicts within Georgian borders by supporting the Abkhazia and South Ossetia secessionist movements and by continuing its military presence in the country, as well as periodic energy and remittances cut-offs. The South Caucasus might be the next conflict hot spot. Soon, there will be conceivably an open need for security operations to bring stability to the region.

ENDNOTES

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3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Russian Peacekeepers in Georgia

In Keeping the Peace, Russia is Accused of Lapses in Neutrality



AUDREY ROBERTS

AFTER THE collapse of the former Soviet Union, Georgia became enmeshed in a number of internal conflicts. The most notable of these conflicts were the secessionist wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the early 1990s, these conflicts triggered an outflow of more than 200,000 refugees. Many observers consider a military presence as the only successful stabilization force.

In its post-dissolution National Security Concept, Russia declared that the existing and latent conflicts in its territory and in the 'near abroad' are the main sources of threats to its stability and security. The Concept determined that Russia's long-term interests require its wider participation in peacekeeping operations. From 1992 onwards, Russia started to conduct peacekeeping operations in the 'near abroad' – the territory of the former Soviet Union. Russia pledged to translate its internationally approved "special powers and responsibilities as a guarantor of peace and stability" into neutral measures serving sustainable peace and stability in the region. No such peacekeeping function had ever been envisaged for the Russian army.

In contrast to classical United Nations peacekeeping, in most cases, Russia unilaterally had to deploy its military contingents in accordance with bilateral agreements. While Russian peacekeepers have not raised much concern where they act in support operations under UN command, their activities in the 'near abroad' have been frequently criticized. There are Russian contingents working as part of the UN Mission in Georgia, but that is quite a separate issue.

Since the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts subsided in the early 1990s, Russia has successfully restricted international involvement beyond the UN's rather limited observation mandate in Abkhazia and the mandate of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in South Ossetia.

Although South Ossetia is historically a part of Georgia, in 1989 the Ossetians

demanded to be reunited with the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic, in Russia. South Ossetia was the first conflict zone to test Russia's newly instituted Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping concept. The 1992 Sochi Agreement established the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF), a cease-fire between the Georgian and South Ossetian

Although nominally a CIS force, the regiment of around 2,000 peacekeepers and military observers was composed exclusively of Russian forces, unlike the JPKF in South Ossetia. The mandate authorized CISPKF to police the cease-fire and guarantee stability for the safe return of refugees.

It has been argued that Russia used the name of the CIS as a facade of international respectability for its pursuit of what Georgians perceive as Russia's national interests. Russia, and some leading CIS states (including Georgia), have sometimes held clearly opposing views not only on the methods and means of conflict management, but on the very essence of collective peacekeeping and international security.

Georgia accuses Moscow of stirring tensions in the two secessionist regions. However, Russia views their troop presence as the means to prevent a resurgence of the conflicts. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has consistently demanded the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, accusing Russia of siding with the separatists and thereby undermining Georgia's territorial integrity.

Although not legally binding, the Georgian parliament passed a 2006 resolution calling on the government to take immediate measures to expedite the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingents from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. At the same time, it tasks the government with securing promises from the international community to deploy alternative peacekeepers.

In Spring 2007, the idea of possibly replacing Russian peacekeepers in Georgia's conflict zones with EU peacekeepers was raised by EU officials on a few different occasions, but only if Russia and the separatists ever agreed to such a plan. In addition, there are a number of countries that have expressed their readiness to participate in the peacekeeping operations in Georgia, including the Baltic States, Estonia, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. In the absence of an alternative force, Russian peacekeepers will maintain the status of the major guarantor of stability and security in the region, whether there is a neutral basis of their intentions in Georgia or they are just looking out for Russia's long-term interests.



Photo: UN Association of Georgia

Russian peacekeepers in Georgia.

forces and defined both a zone of conflict and a security corridor along the border of South Ossetian territories. Due to the lack of volunteers and poor equipment of Georgian and South Ossetian peacekeepers, Russia took over the lead. The JPKF is composed of three battalions: Georgian, Russian and Ossetian. Each battalion is authorized to have a maximum of 500 troops in the region.

The different national contingents patrol separately. This might explain the Georgian perception that the Russians selectively extend protection of Ossetian civilians and to Ossetian smugglers, while ignoring Ossetian reprisals against the unrecognized republic's minority Georgian population. Almost 90 percent of the South Ossetian population have acquired Russian passports, and hence, they argue, are entitled to Russian "protection."

In May 1994, the UN and Russia negotiated the Moscow Agreement which established a CIS Peacekeeping Force (CISPKF) to replace the Russian force that had been present since 1993. However, Russia's peacekeeping undertakings in Abkhazia were extended under the CISPKF.

The author is a Research Associate at IPOA.

New Bills Compete for Prominence in U.S. Congress

An Overview of the Raft of Proposed Legislation in the New Democratic House and Senate



FIONA MANGAN

THE USE OF private security contractors in support of United States' missions overseas has been the subject of a heated and frequent debate on Capitol Hill over the past few years. Discussions over contracting and the accountability of private actors in complex contingency operations abroad are often clouded by a large number of untruths in circulation about the work and use of such companies, including inaccurate reports of the number of contractors being used and the notion that private security contractors are beyond the law.

These topics of contractor accountability and the transparency of the contracting process have been the theme of a recent flurry of new legislation in the U.S. Congress and Senate, since the beginning of the 110th Congress. The debate has focused on concern and confusion over the use of private security contractors, particularly in relation to U.S. missions currently in Iraq and Afghanistan. The new bills seek to clarify and control the use of contractors in complex contingency operations and to establish appropriate methods of ensuring contractor accountability for situations of wrongdoing by contractors in the field.

While these bills have many positive attributes, they each suffer from technical weaknesses including inadequate definitions and miscomprehension of the nature of work performed by contractors in the field. Improvement of failings in the current federal contracting framework and the tightening of laws governing contractor accountability are welcomed by the peace and stability operations industry. It remains to be seen what impact these new bills will have on this complex debate over the use of private security contractors and their role in support of U.S. missions overseas.

The author is a former Senior Associate at IPOA.

All photos taken from the respective Representative or Senator's web sites.



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GUIDE TO CURRENT LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES



Sen. Patrick Leahy
(D-Vermont)



Sen. Barack Obama
(D-Illinois)



Rep. David Price
(D-North Carolina)



Rep. Jan Schakowsky
(D-Illinois)



Rep. Henry Waxman
(D-California)

The **War Profiteering Prevention Act** was introduced by Senator Leahy on January 4, 2007. This legislation discusses measures against fraud and excessive profit in the contracting process. The bill would have extraterritorial jurisdiction and work to support current anti-fraud legislation. This bill may be problematic as it fails to define the phrase 'war profiteering', therefore potentially causing confusion and misuse of the legislation.

The **Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act** was introduced into the Senate on February 16, 2007. Senator Obama introduced this bill in support of Rep. Price's bill in Congress and it has many similar features to Price's proposed legislation. The Obama bill also focuses on improving the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) by increasing resources allocated for its implementation. The bill also demands some extremely onerous reporting from government departments at every stage of the contracting process, including Department of Defense (DoD) reports on the appropriateness and exact numbers of contractors working on DoD contracts and a Department of Justice report into their application, or failure to apply, MEJA thus far.

The **Transparency and Accountability in Security Contracting Act** was introduced into the House of Representatives on January 10, 2007. It seeks to enhance and clarify MEJA by providing greater resources to contracting officers, to increase oversight for private security contracts and by demanding increased reporting throughout the contracting process. The Price bill aims to improve coordination in the field between US Armed Forces and contractors who are performing security functions through a 'Theater Security Contract Coordinating Officer.' The bill outlines a plan for an in-theater FBI unit to carry out investigations of criminal misconduct by contract personnel. In addition to these practical steps, Price suggests a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the cost-effectiveness of private security contracting.

The **Iraq and Afghanistan Contractor Sunshine Act** was introduced into the House of Representatives by Rep. Schakowsky on February 7, 2007. This bill seeks information on contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of U.S. missions and demands greater transparency and control over the contracting process. It requires the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Interior, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development to provide to Congress copies and descriptions of contracts and task orders in excess of \$5 million for work to be performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Information sought includes number of contractors, total cost of contracts, total figures of contractors killed or wounded, laws broken under such contracts and disciplinary action taken.

The **Accountability in Contracting Act** was introduced by Rep. Waxman on March 6, 2007. This seeks to provide strict guidelines for the contracting process. The bill limits the use of 'abuse prone' contracts, including non-competitive contracts, sole-source contracts and cost-reimbursement contracts. Waxman also suggests measures for increasing contract oversight and deterring corruption by demanding greater transparency from all agencies involved in contracting.

Civilians and Military Law: Un Unconstitutional Mix

Problems with Applying UCMJ to Contractors and its Effects Internationally



KATHLEEN DUIGNAN

IN SECTION 552 of the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 109-364, 120 Stat. 2217 (2006), Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) quietly added a few words ("declared war or a contingency operation" to replace simply "war") to Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and potentially created one of the most sweeping changes to military justice in the past 50 years. But these three words, regardless how well intended, require further full study.

The change to Article 2, while seemingly innocuous, greatly expands court-martial jurisdiction over civilians to an extent not fathomed or recognized in recent history. Even more surprising, is since the provision was enacted, there has been no call for a study or hearings to define the scope of its implementation or issue guidelines as to its application to the various flavors of contractors serving in both Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as conflicts to come. This change was most likely made in a well-intentioned effort to hold contractors responsible for criminal acts overseas for which they have largely escaped liability. But intentions, no matter how good, can invoke unintended consequences.

The International Peace Operations Association sponsored a panel held on Capitol Hill on February 27, 2007 in which two panels discussed the change and offered opinions as to its desirability, potential future application, unintended consequence, and potential alternatives. In a way not usually seen inside Washington, all panelists agreed that this change to the UCMJ may have done a service to the issue of contractor liability by bringing the conversation to the forefront, but the change itself should not remain on the books for long.

The court-martial of civilians has had a long and tortured history in the annals of military justice jurisprudence. See e.g., *United States v. Averette*, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 363, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970) (court-martial of civilian contractor in Vietnam not permissible under the circumstances); and *Reid v. Covert*, 354 U.S. 1 (1954) (court-martial for civilian dependent wives accused of conspiracy and murder of their active-duty husbands overseas is not permissible). This new "fix" to allow courts-martial for civilians serving in the field creates more problems

than it solves, because the application of military offenses against civilians is subject to anticipated years of Constitutional challenge. And not only does the court-martial of civilians pose legal problems, it poses practical ones as well. For instance, there is no "chain-of-command" in the traditional sense by which to begin and refer court-martial charges. Additionally, there is

overseas. And while having Status of Forces Agreements in place legally ensures that our civilian personnel do not face local justice systems without our consent, the United States limits its bargaining position for entering into future such agreements by loosening the standards by which military justice can be applied to civilians abroad.

Additionally, governments overseas frequently look to developments in our law as potential models for emulation. Last year, the Constitutional Court of Uganda cited to United States Rules for Courts-Martial in a judicial opinion upholding the court-martial of civilians in their own country. However, the Court overlooked our case law interpreting UCMJ Article 2 that traditionally limited the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction to civilians under very restricted circumstances. To correct the Ugandan court's misperception of United States law on this point, last year the National Institute of Military Justice filed an *amicus curiae* brief with the Supreme Court of Uganda to correct the perception that application of Article 2 of the UCMJ applied widely to all categories of civilians listed in the Manual for courts-martial. By illustrating that we restrict our own application of military law against civilians, the United States can set a powerful example and limit the harm to governments and justice systems that may occur when military tribunals are used for purely political purposes. Last year, when we filed our original brief, we were able to emphatically correct the perception that our own military law is liberally applied to civilians. This year, we could not make the same strong points in light of the change to Article 2.

The United States can much more rationally solve its own jurisdictional gaps by properly funding the Department of Justice to pursue these types of cases through civilian law and courts, especially relying upon the recently enacted Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Public Law 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (2000).

Senator Graham had it right by trying to plug the legal black hole into which a small handful of government contractors fall. However, court-martialing civilians is not the answer to this problem. Congress should instead exercise oversight, use its power of the purse, and ensure that the Department of Justice vigorously and seriously pursues civilian prosecutions of those liable to ensure criminal conduct committed abroad by contractors is every bit as serious and predictably punishable as conduct committed by civilians and contractors here at home.



Photo: Roger S. Duncan/U.S. Department of Defense
Ugandan troops stand in formation. The Ugandan authorities have used the U.S. UCMJ as a benchmark for their own treatment of civilian contractors in conflict zones.

the question about whether court-martial offenses that reach into personal private conduct can constitutionally be criminally pursued against civilian contractors, like charges alleging adultery or sodomy. But there is another, often overlooked, reason to avoid implementing this new provision. There are strong foreign policy reasons why the United States should rethink its use of court-martial jurisdiction against civilians in the field.

First, contractors need not be United States citizens. Locals are frequently hired by the United States to perform work overseas, like translators. Subjecting civilian foreign nationals to United States court-martial procedures overseas could tread on the sovereignty of that nation over its own citizens, regardless of whether they are working for the United States. This does not seem to be the precedent we wish to set for our civilian personnel who are employed

The author is a former JAG officer and currently the Executive Director for the National Institute of Military Justice, a non-profit in Washington, DC affiliated with American University.

Navigating the Human Terrain

The Importance of Cultural Understanding in Contingency Operations



AUDREY ROBERTS

THIS ARTICLE will address the importance of cultural understanding in contingency operations, with particular attention paid to private contractors. My point of entry for this work is the recognition that all international operations take place in the context of multiple cultures – organizational, local and expatriate. It should be recognized, appreciated and institutionalized that culture shapes behavior. Cultural considerations should play a part in navigating through military campaigns, peacekeeping and post-conflict operations.

There are a number of initiatives within the military community to design and run programs with a cultural knowledge element. Unfortunately, the programs are dispersed; there is no consistent information sharing mechanism and they are under-funded. As is the nascent operational belief within the U.S. Armed Forces, within the private sector there should be an operational belief that understanding culture has a strategic and tactical significance which should be incorporated in the overall mission.

Cultural understanding is not yet considered a *conditio sine qua non* for a successful contingency operation, but it should be. Cultural understanding has never been nor should it be a priority in major combat operations; but it should be in counterinsurgency, peacekeeping and post-conflict operations. Examples of the importance of culture can be seen in the breakdown of the U.S. military's management of Vietnam, and current campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Little evidence suggests that the historical and socio-economic contexts were or are adequately understood in the pre-deployment, operational and post-conflict phases of these conflicts, with even less consideration made of the additional dominant narratives that contribute to national, ethnic and religious identities – namely, the local culture(s).

Culture is often assumed to be in stasis with no temporal or spatial variances. However, culture is actually dynamic, affecting and being affected. Culture is not homogenous throughout a country (and

possibly not even throughout neighborhoods). Pre-operational, conflict and post-conflict cultural considerations can lead to informed judgment calls, expectation management, perception management and valuing cultural awareness in areas of operation in tandem with situational awareness.

U.S. government contracts usually require vetting and weapons qualification, but rarely, if ever, cultural training. Many contractors rely on experts because the pace of business does not allow much time for basic training. Ex-Special Forces tend to be hired as 1099 contract employees for their expertise, as they have years of specialized training and are expected to operate


Representatives of the international community at one point saw their mission as strictly humanitarian in nature. After all, why wouldn't they? They were distributing food, thus saving lives. In stark contrast, many Somalis believed the operation was intended to convert the Muslim population, or viewed it as an assault on their community and an attempt to trump their political leaders. Vital aspects of this conflict were overlooked in preference to preconceived (Western) notions of peace and security. To avoid repeating this operational maelstrom, local leaders and organizations should be viewed as essential partners. Involving local institutions and agencies with any international operation is a challenging but an essential task.

As there is a mutually affecting relationship between the local population and any present foreign contingents, it is important to engage in activities intended to increase the understanding of the local population. All it takes is one errant U.S. soldier or private contractor to shift a community, or a country's popular perception of the U.S. and all of its in-country representatives. The U.S. Marine Corps undertakes massive public affairs campaigns accompanied by the distribution of leaflets, common and consistent talking points, and radio shows.

Contractors are usually unable to launch public affairs campaigns unless they are authorized to do so by their contract.

Due to the fact that contingency operations are often multi-lateral, organizational cultures need to be considered as well. Different national governments, non-governmental organizations, international organizations and the private sector often differ widely in their organizational cultures, not to mention the different branches of the U.S. Armed Forces. The different civilian actors and military contingents might have different understandings of 'security' and 'management' and 'contracts'. This might be highly problematic if there is a lack of communication among these actors. Unfortunately, this sometimes tends to be the case.

There has not been an operational focus on cultural training and disseminating cultural knowledge because soldiers and contractors operating in the areas of operation are focused on their jobs. A necessary cultural awareness is not included in their job description. It should be.



An excerpt from the U.S. Marine Corps Smart Card for Iraq Operations

effectively in different cultural settings.

A representative of one private firm interviewed for this article anticipated that in the near future they will be requiring their 1099 employees to complete courses through the "Tactical Language and Culture Training System." This interactive system, which is designed as a video game, covers non-verbal gestures and norms of etiquette that are essential to communicate professionally in different cultural environments, has the potential to be a very valuable tool.

Another example of a potentially useful tool in the field is the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity's Smart Card, which was first distributed in 2003. It is a 20-panel portable cultural reference guide. These Smart Cards have been distributed to troops in a wide range of countries, including Iraq, Mali and Georgia. For cultural training, whether in the classroom or virtual, and guides to be useful, soldiers and contractors must be able to apply and employ this knowledge in the field.

Understanding the locals' intent, and one's intent being understood by the locals appropriately in an unfamiliar cultural context is also integral to operating in complex cultural settings. A failure to appreciate this fact is evinced in the 1992-93 multi-lateral operations in Somalia.

COLUMNISTS

Is Zimbabwe Heading for Collapse?

The Bread Basket of Africa Has Become the Basket Case of Africa



AMBASSADOR HERMAN J. COHEN

AS A STATE and as a society, the southern African republic of Zimbabwe is in deep trouble.

With inflation running at an annual rate of 1,700 percent; with unemployment rising above 60 percent and with 20 percent of the population having emigrated within the past five years, Zimbabwe may be moving toward a downward spiral of uncontrollable decline. A once shining example of economic promise, Zimbabwe has become a sinking hulk.

What went wrong? The people of Zimbabwe are the victims of pathological leadership. There is no other rational explanation.

The state of Zimbabwe was born in 1980 after a guerrilla war between African nationalist movements and the white minority Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith. The movement that demonstrated the greatest prowess during the insurgency, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), received the most votes in the country's first democratic election. The party's leader, Robert Mugabe, became the first President.


At a time when most African peoples had already become disillusioned with the one-party state, and with the state-centered Marxist economic system, Mugabe came to power deeply imbued with the Leninist political philosophy. At the top of his list of priorities was the absolute importance of keeping the socialist vanguard party in power, at all costs. With this line of thought, he was an anachronism from the very beginning.

As long as Mugabe and his ZANU party were popular, he had no need to worry about the white commercial farmers who were earning significant amounts of money for Zimbabwe through large scale capitalist agriculture. He also expanded education to the point where all Zimbabwean children could aspire to finish high school. But because of his belief in scientific socialism, Mugabe did little to encourage private investment beyond the commercial farms

The author is a former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, and is President of Cohen & Woods International. Ambassador Cohen is also a member of the Board of Directors for the Peace Operations Institute. His column appears regularly in the Journal.

that pre-dated his rise to power.

Toward the mid-1990s, the economic situation began to deteriorate. With very little private investment, the large number of high school graduates could not find employment. Extended drought caused deprivation in the rural areas. Corruption within the government and the ruling party became pervasive. Mugabe and the ruling party lost a lot of support. An opposition political party based on urban labor unions started to achieve traction. Mugabe lost a referendum for a change to the constitution.



Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, addressing the UN Security Council.

This was his signal to snuff out the country's embryonic democracy and invoke Leninist doctrine of the supremacy of the vanguard party.

The white commercial farmers were ejected from their lands without compensation. Agricultural exports took a deep decline. Food became scarce. The opposition political party was increasingly harassed by the police and intelligence services. There was massive disinvestment. Mugabe transitioned into a one-man dictatorship. The Leninist became an African Lenin.

The essence of politics in Zimbabwe in 2007 is the struggle within the ZANU party to force Mugabe to retire in order to prevent the total collapse of both the Zimbabwe economy and the Zimbabwe social fabric. So far, Mugabe appears to be in control,

and Zimbabwe continues to decline.

What does the Zimbabwe crisis mean for the stability of southern Africa? In that region, Mugabe remains an iconic symbol of anti-colonialism and guerrilla hero. It is therefore difficult for neighboring leaders to criticize Mugabe's destructive policies. The first problem for South Africa, Botswana and Namibia is the large emigration of Zimbabwe's most talented people who are competing with nationals for scarce employment.

Is there a possibility of serious instability as the Zimbabwean people become more desperate? The police and military are well taken care of, and appear to be in control and loyal. So far, street demonstrations are being repressed, and opposition political meetings are being broken up with lots of broken heads. There is absolutely no sign of external elements trying to infiltrate arms.

The key to Zimbabwe's stability continues to lie in the rural areas where the majority of the people live. If they become desperate, the police and military are not likely to stand in the way of aggressive mass demonstrations, or even worse.

As thousands more urban dwellers, making a living, return to their villages, the tipping point of popular revolution may be approaching. It is definitely time for Mugabe to retire for the sake of his nation's survival, and for the ZANU party to strip itself of the decrepit Leninist political generation, and begin a process of renewal led by the younger enlightened ZANU militants who are waiting in the wings.

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Ramsey, NJ 07446-1251 USA
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COLUMNISTS

What's in a Name?

The Importance of Language for the Peace and Stability Operations Industry



J. J. MESSNER

LANGUAGE IS A very powerful tool of persuasion. When advocates of repealing estate taxes speak, they always refer to the "death tax." Why? Because labeling a benign issue with a mean and nasty sounding moniker makes it sound just that — mean and nasty. Most of the population may not really care about the intricacies of an "estate tax" but who wants to be "taxed for dying?"

This small vignette illustrates an important issue facing the peace and stability operations industry—the "m" word. The term "mercenary" is commonly used to describe the private peace and stability operations industry by opponents and those who lack a fundamental understanding of exactly what it is that the industry does. Regardless, it is a popular pejorative term among those who don't particularly care for the private sector's role in peace and stability operations.

A recent web log entry provides a very cogent example of this issue. The blogger was writing about the decision of the U.S. government to enlist the services of a private company to support the operations of the UN peacekeeping force in Somalia. The blog entry described the contract for logistical support as "U.S. Hires Mercs for Africa Ops."¹

Give me a break.

The author is the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of International Peace Operations and is Director-General of the Peace Operations Institute and the Director of Programs and Operations at IPOA.

From the outset, the blogger is obviously cognizant of the fact that this contract is wholly concerned with logistical support. But wait, there's more:

"Other company operations in Africa include a program to disarm and rehabilitate former soldiers in Liberia, while advising the government on the reconstitution of the army. The company also supports peacekeepers in southern Sudan, and is working with the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia to help the African Union create a standby military force to respond to emergencies."²

This company is *obviously* up to no good. Disarming combatants? Advising a government on post-conflict reconstruction? Helping the AU to establish a standby force to potentially deal with emergencies like the Rwanda or Darfur genocides? How could this be allowed to happen?

I apologize if my comments are dripping with too much sarcasm. I think we can assume that the blogger might just have the slightest agenda behind those comments. I can understand the classical "soldier of fortune" concept, although more mythical than real. But I never imagined "mercenaries" cleaning toilets or serving food in the mess hall. And it is not as if these contractors randomly decided one day that they would take over Africa one toilet block at a time. This contractor was hired by the U.S. government on behalf of the UN, after all. You want legitimacy? You've got legitimacy.

If we are to follow this blogger's logic, we would have to call a doctor working for an aid agency in a conflict zone a "mercenary."

That doctor is not acting in an official capacity, but rather for a private organization. Where does it end?

There is fundamental opposition from many people to the concept of profiting from conflict. Indeed, the next most popular pejorative term after "mercenary" is "war profiteer." But this term is equally misleading. The peace and stability operations industry is involved in doing just that — providing peace and stability. If anything, the industry profits from security.

Describing the peace and stability

operations industry as "war profiteers" is akin to describing hospitals as "sickness profiteers." Sickness is going to exist with or without hospitals. But few would want to live in a world where there were not institutions here to treat sickness, even if that sickness mitigation has to be paid for. Doctors and nurses have to eat and pay their mortgages, after all.

The world is a nasty place, full of insecurity. Insecurity, and indeed war, is going to exist with or without the peace and stability operations industry. But a more secure world is a fundamentally good thing. So, if there is an added incentive — financial, in this case — to improve security, then why the opposition?

Oddly enough, private companies are referred to as "war profiteers" and yet developing countries who contract out their militaries for UN peacekeeping operations — and, cash in on the *per diem* — are hailed for their contributions. Indeed, some countries derive a massive chunk of their defense budgets just from UN peacekeeping operations. If one argues that private companies supporting peace and stability operations are "war profiteers" then the same label must be given to developing countries who rent their armies to the UN. And no one seems to think that would be fair.

Unfortunately, these issues of terminology are not restricted to the sensationalist media or the halls of academia. Governments are acting on these misperceptions.

The South African mercenary legislation is still pending. The bill was passed by the South African parliament, and is awaiting assent from President Thabo Mbeki. The legislation would prohibit South African citizens from working for private contractors in conflict zones, and would also severely curtail private support for peacekeeping operations across the whole African continent. If any continent needs help with peacekeeping, it is Africa.

It all comes down to the perception of what constitutes a "mercenary." Language is an incredibly powerful tool. If the peace and stability operations industry is to truly reach its full potential, it is critically important that the language of discourse regarding the industry be properly understood, and used descriptively, not destructively.

ENDNOTES

1. URL located at: http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/03/us_hires_mercs_.html
2. Ibid.

N G O P R O F I L E

Global Youth Partnership for Africa

Fostering Understanding, Appreciation, Respect Between Young American and African Leaders

THE GLOBAL Youth Partnership for Africa is a non-profit organization that runs programs that offer a unique opportunity for American and African youth to engage directly with one another in grassroots development projects, cultural exchanges, and peace-building efforts.

In the U.S., GYPA coordinates cultural exchange programs for American youth to travel to Africa and learn about the realities facing the continent first-hand. GYPA also directs a number of educational and fundraising campaigns on college campuses across the country that raise awareness about HIV/AIDS, economic development, post-conflict reconstruction, and the use of sports to achieve social change.

GYPA's offices in Kampala and Gulu serve to build capacity amongst the children, youth, and women of Uganda. GYPA strives to partner with existing, indigenous initiatives in an effort to support local leadership. The Uganda-based staff



Photo: GYPA

accomplish this through recreational sports, creative arts, and traditional cultural programs that educate, train, and encourage the spirit of self-empowerment and entrepreneurship. GYPA Uganda equips tomorrow's educators, leaders, and citizens in Africa with the skills, tools, and resources necessary to promote sustainable social change through healthy living, economic empowerment, peace-building, and the

successful design and implementation of youth-led community building efforts.

GYPA's community-based programs include *Girls Kick It*, a comprehensive sports program that provides young women and

girls opportunities to educate and empower themselves. Another initiative is the Gomo Tong Football Club. In 2006 GYPA brought 12 young Ugandans to Cape Town, South Africa to participate in the Homeless World Cup. They proudly represented Uganda in this unique soccer tournament, which included homeless people from 48 nations. This July, Gomo Tong FC will participate in the 2007 Homeless World Cup in Copenhagen, Denmark.

The Helping Hands Medical Fellowship (HHMF) is one of GYPA's most successful and longest-running initiatives. HHMF is a program in partnership with an organization called Brit Olam whereby Israeli physicians, counselors, psychologists, nutritionists, and other health experts spend from 2-4 months working at the Nsambiya Hospital in Namuwongo, a slum outside of Kampala, Uganda. The purpose of HHMF is to increase education and awareness about how to practice a healthy lifestyle, teach and train local medical practitioners in issues pertaining to public health, reduce stigma and prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, and improve family planning programs for women in Namuwongo Zone B. Participating physicians also offer necessary care and treatment for general illness and disease.

Profile contributed by Global Youth Partnership for Africa.

GYPA FACTBOX



| | |
|--------------------|--|
| Founded: | 2006 |
| Offices: | Washington, D.C. Kampala, Uganda |
| On the Web: | www.gypafrica.org |
| E-mail: | info@gypafrica.org |
| Address: | 1101 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Suite 601 Washington, DC 20004 |
| Telephone: | +1 202.756.4601 |

PEACEKEEPING EQUIPMENT PROFILE

The Illyushin IL-76: Logistical Backbone of Global PKOs

Giant Freighter is a Frequent Visitor to the World's Conflict Zones

THE ILYUSHIN IL-76 has proved to be an incredibly effective aircraft for ferrying supplies to peacekeeping missions and conflict zones around the world. The aircraft, originally designed to meet the Soviet Union's extensive domestic logistics needs, continues to be produced at a factory in Tashket, Uzbekistan, over 35 years after it first flew.

Aside from the advantage of a low per-unit cost, the IL-76 provides many added benefits to operators. For example, the aircraft was designed to cope with the harsh conditions of Siberia and the Russian Arctic. As such, the aircraft is incredibly rugged, and can cope with even the worst weather conditions. Furthermore, the aircraft is able to operate from short, poorly developed airstrips, a common concern in many remote parts of the world.



Photo: USAID

The aircraft is, however, a gas guzzler, and various developers have examined equipping the aircraft with more efficient western engines. Nevertheless, the aircraft remains heavily restricted from operating in European or American airspace due to its loud noise.

Profile by J. J. Messner

EQUIPMENT FACTBOX

ILYUSHIN IL-76

| | |
|---------------------|--|
| First Flight | 1971 (series production began in 1975) |
| Crew | Five (two pilots, engineer, navigator, radio) |
| Capacity | Cargo: 52,000 kg (114,640 lb) payload |
| Dimensions | Length: 46.59 m (152.10 ft) Height: 14.76 m (48 ft 5 in) Wingspan: 50.50 m (165 ft 8 in) |
| Weights | Gross (empty): 101,000 kg (222,665 lb) Maximum take-off: 200,000 kg (440,925 lb) |
| Performance | Maximum Speed: 850 km/h (470 kt) Maximum Range: 6,700 km (1,970 nm) |
| Production | Approximately 900 (300 still in-service) |

Solomon Islands

The Solomon Islands Calls Upon its Neighbors for Assistance



YLANA GRACIELLI

THE Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), also known as *Operation Helpem Fren*, began in July 2003 when Prime Minister Allan Kemakeza requested help from Australia and other neighboring countries. The aim of the mission was to "assist the Solomon Islands restore law and order and facilitate economic recovery." The country had been struggling with internal problems which had widely affected its internal law enforcement institutions, hence the need for assistance. However, to better understand this scenario, it is necessary to have a better understanding of the islands' background.

The Solomon Islands are no stranger to conflict. In World War II, the Japanese invaded the islands, setting the scene for the famous battle of Guadalcanal, between Japanese and Allied forces. The country gained independence from Great Britain in 1978, and since then the country has faced significant economical and social challenges. Internal turmoil caused by friction between local ethnic groups – people from the island of Guadalcanal and settlers from the neighboring island of Malaita – has led to significant violence, leaving hundreds dead and over 20,000 Malaitians displaced.

A coup in 2000 resulted in endemic crime. The Guadalcanal Liberation Front (GLF) militants and the opposing Malaitia Eagle Force (MEF), terrorized the government and citizenry in the capital, Honiara. Deficient government administration has worsened the situation up to a point where the Prime Minister took the extreme step of asking for international help. Fortunately, some of the Solomon Islands' neighbors were ready to respond.

RAMSI is described as a "truly regional response to a regional challenge." Fifteen countries of the Pacific Islands Forum are part of this initiative. The main idea behind RAMSI is to help the Solomon Islands government restore law and order, reduce corruption, strengthen government institutions and reinvigorate the economy.

The first priority of the mission is to restore law and order. There are approximately 300 police officers from across the region that are working with their Solomon Islands counterparts to ensure the law is respected. The mission has provided personnel, infrastructure and administrative support to key justice agencies and the courts to ensure that the country's justice system operates effectively, openly and fairly.

Among other initiatives, over 6,300 people have been arrested so far and 3,600 weapons have been collected or seized, following the gun amnesty that occurred in August 2003. Besides that, RAMSI is assisting the Solomon Islands Prison Service to build local capacity to maintain prison security and ensure accountability and a consistent level of service.

Immediately after notifying the UN Security Council, an initial RAMSI force of 2,000 Australian-led troops and police was deployed on 24 July 2003. The mission's military component aims to provide logistical support and to act as additional protection for the mission.

RAMSI's presence was immediately beneficial. Both GLF and MEF commanders surrendered in August 2003. Also, over 400 officers of the Royal Solomon Island Police (RSIP), about a third of the active police service, were fired or retired, with some even being placed on trial for various crimes. The Participating Police Force (PPF) of the mission worked together with the remaining RSIP to strengthen its capabilities and to reestablish the force as a vital national institution. Since 2003, RSIP and PPF personnel have established police posts in each of the 17 provinces and have begun training new police recruits at the RSIP police academy in Rove.

Following the quick restoration of peace in its first year of deployment, RAMSI reduced its military presence and switched its focus to economic and governance reform. Placing 18 advisors within the Ministry of Finance to assist the government in addressing corruption, the mission hopes to strengthen public finances, to encourage broad-based economic growth and create a more prosperous Solomon Islands.

RAMSI has assisted the Solomon Islands Government deliver a program of targeted economic reform in areas such as taxation, transport, industry revitalization and simplifying regulatory requirements, as well as working with the Islands' government to ensure that future budgets are sustainable. RAMSI is also supporting Solomon Islands' many provincial farmers, and RAMSI has assisted in the formulation of an Agriculture and Rural Development Strategy.

RAMSI is mostly an Australian enterprise in personnel and financial resources, and Australians hold several top posts within Solomon Island government, civil service and financial bodies. This overt presence and influence in state institutions has created friction. Presidential elections in 2006, the first since the deployment in 2003, sparked the worst violence the archipelago



Satellite Images From Google Maps



MISSION FACT BOX

RAMSI
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
Commenced

24 July 2003

Due to expire

Open-ended

Special Coordinator
Timothy George
(Australia)
Police Force Commander
Will Jamieson
(Australia)
Current strength

320 police

180 civilian personnel

Contributors of Personnel
Australia, Cook Islands,
Fiji, Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia,
Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue,
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga,
Tuvalu, Vanuatu
Budget

US\$159.4 million



Photo: Australian DFAT
Timothy George,
RAMSI Special Coordinator.

has experienced since the mission's arrival. The mission's failure to anticipate the post-election violence, combined with the subsequent election of Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare in May 2006, left RAMSI facing a government that was less accommodating than its predecessor. The continuing efforts to rebuild the Solomon Islands in the face of a less friendly Sogavare government eager to achieve autonomy will pose great challenges for RAMSI in the coming year.

ENDNOTES

1. RAMSI. 2007. RAMSI's mandate. URL located at: <http://www.ramsi.org/node/6>.
2. DFAT. 2007. Operation Helpem Fren. URL located at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo-solomon_islands/helpemfren/index.html.


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
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 Vandalism Excessive packaging Free trade agreements Outdated technology Supplier management
 Hard-drive crashes Air Cargo Manifest – Form 7509 Turkey Certificate of Origin and Consular invoice
 Handshake deals Contingent liability Enlargement of the EU Regional protectionism Monopolies
 Government regulation of foreign investments New Port of Shanghai regulations
 Political turmoil Cold chain temperature control Missing forms
 Consumer product recalls New infrastructure projects
 Six-sigma process improvement Hidden fees Regionalisation
 conflicts Driver availability Proof of delivery
 Blockade at the Port of Beirut
 Landing rights Fuel surcharges
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 Population shifts
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 The unimaginable Cultural ignorance
 Category 5 hurricane in the Caribbean
 Last-minute redirects Misspelled labels
 Two-digit fields when four are required Epidemics Damaged goods
 Security clearances Trade subsidies New product introductions Incomplete instructions
 Poorly written manuals Changing regulations Pick-up and delivery Routine maintenance Arson
 Work permits Production shut-downs Insufficient lighting Employee relocation Government tender procedures
 Political change Sudden market fluctuations Long labor negotiations Earthquake in Kabul
 Price controls Mountains of paperwork Port storage costs Multilateral treaties Coast Guard inspections
 New production technology VAT deferral Point-of-sale data collection Mismanagement Zoning restrictions
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